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1 Introduction
The ongoing integration of the world market has lead to a high degree of
specialisation in industrial production. The resulting relocation of industry
leads to the formation of new industrial clusters as well as the break-up of
already existing ones. Policymakers care about industrial clusters and their
geographical location, since clusters are associated with rents. Membership
of clusters and inter-…rm networks is strongly believed to enhance the pro-
ductivity, and competitive performance of …rms.
Industrial clusters rely on localised positive externalities, which may be
pecuniary or pure in nature. Governments may therefore want to intervene in
order to ensure that the cluster reaches its optimal size. In a closed economy
the rents created in the cluster will be – by de…ntion of a closed economy –
entirely absorbed by domestic factors of production or domestic consumers.
This also means that if a government chooses to intervene, the subsidies given
to the cluster will in the end be returned to the domestic economy.
In a globalised world a government has to take into account by whom
the rents generated in an industrial cluster are received: locals or foreign-
ers? The government must also consider that …rm mobililty may limit the
scope for taxation. In a world with internationally mobile …rms and falling
international trade cost, industrial policy initiatives that allow for welfare
maximization under a closed regime, may no longer be optimal.
In this paper we analyse industrial policies towards manufacturing clus-
ters as countries become integrated in the world economy. We investigate
this in a two-country setting, where there is one high wage and one low wage
economy. Our point of departure is one where there is a cluster that consists
of two vertically linked industries – an upstream and a downstream industry
- located in the high wage country. We show that both trade costs as well
as …rm mobility matter for whether the government would want to tax or
subsidize the industries in the cluster. The more of the rents generated in the
cluster that accrue to foreigners, the less a national welfare maximizing gov-
ernment would like to subsidize the cluster. We also show that the optimal
industrial policy directed towards the upsteam industry di¤ers radically from
the policy towards the downstream industry. It is emhasized that crucial for
whether or not the government would want to intervene in the …rst place is
the gap between factor prices in the high wage and the low wage country.
Lately, other authors have also looked into the issue of economic policy
and industrial agglomeration, e.g. Ludema and Wooton (1998), Haaland
2
and Wooton (1999) Andersson and Forslid (1999), Baldwin and Krugman
(2000), Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), and Norman and
Venables (2001). Our study is distinct from the above in many respects
and, in particular, none of the recent contributions to this literature has
dealt with the di¤erence between upstream and downstream industries. The
distinction turns out to be important for the conduct of industrial policy,
because it a¤ects who earns the rents created in the agglomeration.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an economic geogra-
phy model of a cluster with upsteam and downstream industries. In section
3 we elaborate on agglomeration forces and investigate the sustainability of
clusters. Thereafter industrial policy directed towards clusters and the im-
pact of globalization on optimal policy design are analysed in section 4, and
…nally section 5 concludes.
2 A model with vertically linked …rms
We employ a version of the economic geography model outlined by Venables
(1996). There are two countries; the industrialised high wage country h
(home) and the non-industrialised country f (foreign). Each country may
be active in two sectors: agriculture and manufacturing. Manufacturing,
which produces di¤erentiated goods under imperfect competition, is further
split into two vertically linked industries: Manufacturers of …nal goods and
suppliers of manufacturing intermediates. Both …nal and intermediate goods
are subject to trade costs. Our point of departure is one where the two
manufacturing industries are agglomerated in the home country.
There is one factor of production, labour, which is mobile between sectors,
but immobile between countries. A country may levy taxes on wage income
and …rms’ revenues or costs. We abstract from considerations related to the
provision of public goods and assume a binding budget condition requiring
that tax income equals public transfers. Hence, if a government chooses to
subsidize …rms, a positive tax on labour income must be levied; and vice
versa. Since labour is in …xed supply, tax on labour income is lump sum in
nature.
The representative resident in country i receives income from labour only.
Preferences are given by the utility function
3
U = C1¡°A C
°
M ; 0 < ° < 1; (1)
where CA and CM denote consumption of goods from the agriculture and
manufacturing sector, respectively, and ° is the expenditure share on man-
ufacturing. Agricultural (A) goods can be costlessly traded internationally
and are produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.1
The A-good is chosen as numeraire, so that the world market price of the
agricultural good, pA, is equal to unity. We assume that labour productivity
in agriculture in the foreign non-industrialised low wage country is Á(< 1)
times the productivity in the home country. By choice of scale, unit labour
requirement in the A-sector in the home country is one, which gives
wh = 1; wf = Á: (2)
Within the chosen setting, this will hold as long as ° < 0:5; which implies
that demand for agricultural goods is large enough to guarantee that the
agricultural sector is active in both countries irrespectively of the location of
other production sectors. Factor prices are, thus, given, and we are conse-
quently analysing an industrial agglomeration that is so small that it does
not a¤ect factor prices.
Important for the location of industry is, moreover, the size of the home
market. Here, we want to investigate the e¤ects of international factor price
di¤erences isolated from di¤erences in market size. It is therefore assumed
that the labour stock in country f is 1=Á larger than that of country h
(Lf = Lh=Á); which makes pretax income equal in the two countries.
The consumption of …nal goods from the manufacturing sector is de…ned
as an aggregate of n di¤erentiated goods, CM ´
hPn
k=1 c
¾¡1
¾
k
i ¾
¾¡1
with ¾ > 1;
where ck represents consumption of each good. Each producer operates under
increasing returns to scale at the level of the plant, and in line with Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) we assume that there is large group monopolistic competition
between manufacturers. Thus, both the perceived elasticity of demand and
the elasticity of substitution between any pair of di¤erentiated goods are
equal to ¾.
1We maintain the standard labelling of the two sectors for ease of comparison. More
generally, sector A should be interpreted as a labour-intensive industry.
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A representative manufacturing …rm in country i produces its output xMi
using ® units of input as …xed costs and ¯ per unit of output thereafter, and
has a total cost function given by
TCMi = w
1¡´
i Q
´
Si(®+ ¯xMi); ´ 2 [0; 1i : (3)
In (3) the parameter ´ is the share of total costs that goes to the purchase
of intermediates (with price QSi), while 1¡ ´ goes to labor. Notice that for
´ > 0 we have vertical industry linkages in the sense that the manufacturing
industry (M) uses intermediates produced by the manufacturing supplier
industry (S). The government may want to tax or subsidize manufacturing
production, in which case, a tax (tMi > 0) or subsidy (tMi < 0) based on
total costs will be introduced. Pro…ts in manufacturing are then equal to
¼Mi = pMixMi ¡ (1 + tMi)TCMi: Note, that since we shall be assuming free
entry and zero pro…t, a tax on costs is equivalent to a tax on revenues. Due
to zero pro…ts in equilibrium, tax on pro…ts becomes unapplicable.
All producers have access to the same technology, so prices do not di¤er
between …rms in a given country. Since …rms face a constant demand elas-
ticity they set a constant markup ¾
¾¡1 over marginal costs, the f.o.b. price
from country i = h; f; is given by
pMi =
¾
¾ ¡ 1¯w
1¡´
i Q
´
Si(1 + tMi) (4)
Manufactured goods are tradeable, but we assume Samuelson iceberg
type trade costs, so that only 1
¿
of each unit shipped actually reaches its
destination. This means that the c.i.f. price is ¿ times higher than the f.o.b.
price of an imported good. Trade costs should be thought of as a synthetic
measure of a wide range of trade barriers that are intrinsically wasteful.
Due to free entry there is zero pro…t in the manufacturing sector. Using
the zero pro…t condition in combination with the expression for price and
the cost function, we have that xMi = xM =
®(¾¡1)
¯
in equilibrium; and by
choosing units ¯ ´ ¾¡1
¾
, xM = ®¾ in equilibrium.
Taking the dual of CM we …nd that the price index for the manufacturing
good is
QMi =
£
nip
1¡¾
Mi + nj(¿pMj)
1¡¾¤ 11¡¾ i 6= j; (5)
5
where ni and nj are the number of varieties produced in countries i and j.
Accordingly, the consumer price index can be expressed as
Pi = p
1¡°
A Q
°
Mi i = h; f: (6)
The production technology for manufactured goods requires a compos-
ite of intermediate goods and labor. Intermediate goods are produced by a
supplier industry S, which similarly to industry M is characterised by mo-
nopolistic competition, i.e. all upstream producers have access to the same
technology, so prices do not di¤er between …rms in a given country. A rep-
resentative supplier …rm in country i produces its output xSi using a units of
input as …xed costs and b per unit of output thereafter, and has a total cost
function given by
TCSi = wi(a+ bxSi): (7)
Again, a government may choose to tax or subsidize the cost of production
of intermediate goods, i.e. pro…ts are given by ¼Si = pSixSi ¡ (1 + tSi)TCSi:
Firms set a constant markup ²
²¡1 over marginal costs, the f.o.b. price from
country i = h; f; is given by
pSi =
²
²¡ 1bwi (1 + tSi) (8)
Intermediates are also tradeable, and we assume the same iceberg trade
costs, which implies that only 1
¿
of each unit shipped actually reaches its
destination. There is free entry and zero pro…ts in the supplier industry.
Using the zero pro…t condition in combination with the expression for price
and the cost function, we have that xSi = xS =
a(²¡1)
b
; and after setting
b ´ ²¡1
²
, xS = a² in equilibrium.
Duality allows us to derive the price index for the intermediate good
QSi =
£
mip
1¡²
Si +mj(¿pSj)
1¡²¤ 11¡² i 6= j; (9)
where mi and mj are the number of varieties produced in countries i and
j. In the presence of positive trade costs, a larger share of domestic supplier
…rms leads to a lower QS, which leads to lower cost for local downstream
…rms, as seen in (3).
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From the utility function it follows that the consumer will spend a share
° of income Yi on manufactured goods, i.e. the value of consumption expen-
diture on di¤erentiated goods, EMi is given by
EMi = °Yi i = h; f: (10)
Using Shepard’s lemma on (3), we can derive the demand for intermedi-
ates in the manufacturing industry. Total intermediate demand in country
i, ESi; can thus be expressed as
ESi = ´TCMini i = h; f: (11)
We use Shepard’s lemma to derive domestic and foreign demand for a
variety of the …nal and the intermediate manufactured good produced in
country i:
xMii = p
¡¾
MiQ
¾¡1
Mi EMi; xMij = p
¡¾
MiQ
¾¡1
Mj ¿
1¡¾EMj ; i 6= j: (12)
xSi i = p
¡²
Si Q
²¡1
Si ESi; xSi j = p
¡²
Si Q
²¡1
Sj ¿
1¡²ESj; i 6= j: (13)
Using (12) and the zero pro…ts condition, the product market equilibrium
in the downstream manufacturing industry takes the form
¾® ¸ p¡¾Mi
£
Q¾¡1Mi EMi + ¿
1¡¾Q¾¡1Mj EMj
¤
; ni ¸ 0; i 6= j: (14)
The product market equilibrium in the upstream manufacturing industry
is similarly derived using (13) in combination with the zero pro…ts condition
for the supplier sector:
a² ¸ p¡²Si
£
Q²¡1Si ESi + ¿
1¡²Q²¡1Sj ESj
¤
; mi ¸ 0; i 6= j; (15)
Factor market clearing requires that the supply of labor (Li) in equilib-
rium is equal to demand for labour in manufacturing (LMi), the manufactur-
ing supplier industry (LSi), and agriculture (LAi) so Li = LMi + LSi + LAi:
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Using Shephard’s lemma on equations (3) and (7) to derive labour demand in
the two manufacturing industries, we can rewrite the labour market clearing
condition as
LAi = Li ¡ (1¡ ´)w¡´i Q ´Sini®¾ ¡mia²: (16)
(2) and (16) imply that since each country is active in both manufacturing
and agriculture, labour is totally elastic in supply to both sectors. If one
sector expands, this draws resources out of the other, but does not impact
on factor returns.
A government may choose to tax or subsidize the downstream and/or
the upstream manufacturing industry. A net subsidy to manufacturing will
have to be …nanced by a tax on labour income (ti > 0), while a net tax on
manufacturing will be redistributed in the same way back to the consumers.
The public budget constraint is given by
wiLiti + tMiw
1¡´
i Q
´
Sini®¾ + tSiwia²mi = 0; (17)
and disposable consumer income equals
Yi = (1¡ ti)wiLi: (18)
The general equilibrium is characterized by the equations (2), (4), (5),
(8), (9), (10), (11), (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18), which can be solved to
give equilibrium values for wi, Qsi; QMi; pMi; pSi,EMi,ESi; ni;mi; ti; Yi; LAi for
i = h; f .
3 Manufacturing agglomeration
Our focus here is on industrial policy directed towards industrial clusters.
But before we turn to the policy analysis we want to investigate the forces
holding an economic cluster in place. Our point of departure is a situation
where both the upstream- and downstream manufacturing industries are ag-
glomerated in the home country. But if …rms are internationally mobile, they
may …nd it pro…table to move away from the industrial cluster in h. Here,
it is examined whether the given allocation of economic activity is a stable
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equilibrium; in other words, whether the industrial agglomeration in country
h is sustainable.
This section focuses on how sustainability depends on the level of eco-
nomic integration, whereas the analysis of taxes and welfare is postponed to
section 4. Taxes will therefore all be set to zero.
The foreign country may be an attractive location of production because
of its lower factor prices, and because trade costs attenuate the product mar-
ket competition for a downstream …rm. These dispersion forces, however,
balance against agglomeration forces associated with the home country. Be-
cause …rms are vertically linked there are backward and forward linkages;
more upstream …rms in the region imply a lower price index of intermediate
inputs for downstream …rms (forward link), while more downstream …rms
imply a larger market for upstream …rms (backward link). Thus, the vertical
industry linkages between theM and S industry give rise to location speci…c
external economies of scale if there are positive trade costs.
Agglomeration of manufacturing in h is sustainable if, and only if, the
sales of a …rst (potential) deviating …rm relocating to country f are too low
to break even; in which case there will not be any …rms migrating from
country h to country f . Because of constant mark-up, pro…ts only depend
on sales. The …rst manufacturing …rm that moves to country f faces demand
x¤Mf =
µ
pMf
pMh
¶¡¾ µ
¿1¡¾°Yh + ¿¾¡1°Yf
nhpMh
¶
; (19)
whereas the …rst deviating supplier faces demand
x¤Sf =
µ
pSf
pSh
¶¡²µ
¿1¡²ESh + ¿ ²¡1ESf
mhpSh
¶
: (20)
Note that (19) is derived under the assumption that the entire upstream
industry is concentrated in country h, and (20) similarly relies on the entire
downstream industry being located in country h. The zero pro…t scale is
xM = ®¾ for M-sector …rms, and xS = a² for S-sector …rms. The asymmetric
equilibrium with agglomeration in h is therefore sustained as long as
x¤Mf
®¾
< 1: (21)
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for …nal producers, and
x¤Sf
a²
< 1 (22)
for producers of intermediate goods.
An asymmetric equilibrium implies that nf = mf = 0 giving price indices
QMh = n
1
1¡¾
h pMh; QMf = ¿QMh; QSh = m
1
1¡²
h pSh; QSf = ¿QSh; (23)
with pSh = (1 + tSh)wh and pMh = (1 + tMh)Q
´
Shw
1¡´
h : Using these together
with price equations (4) and (8), and product market clearing conditions,
ESh + ESf = pShxShmh and EMh + EMf = pMhxMhnh; the sustainability
conditions may be rewritten as
x¤Mf
®¾
=
µ
1 + tMf
1 + tMh
¶¡¾
¿1¡¾(1+´)
µ
wf
wh
¶¡¾(1¡´)µ
1 +
Yf
Yh + Yf
¡
¿2(¾¡1) ¡ 1¢¶ < 1
(24)
x¤Sf
a²
=
µ
1 + tSf
1 + tSh
¶¡²µ
wf
wh
¶¡²
¿1¡² < 1: (25)
We plot (24) and (25) for the case without taxes (tMh = tSh = tMf =
tSf = 0). For maximal comparability between the M- and S-sector we set
¾ = ": Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between sustainability and trade
costs, i.e. shows how x¤Mf and x
¤
Sf vary with trade costs in a typical case.
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The …rst thing to note is that the downstream industry exhibits a U-shape
in trade costs; while the upstream industry does not. The U-shape is a result
of the well known non-linear interaction of agglomeration and dispersion
forces (c.f. Fujita et al, 1999): a low degree of product market competition
and low factor prices attract downstream …rms to the foreign country, while
the inferior access to intermediate inputs facing a deviating …rm, works in
the other direction. The production of a deviating upstream …rm, on the
2We use the following standard parameter values in all simulations: ° = 0:45; k =
°°(1¡ °)° ; a = 0:1; ® = 0:1; ² = 2:5; ¾ = 2:5; ´ = 0:4; Á = 0:9:
However, our results are valid in a qualitative sense for a large range of parameter values.
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contrary, rises monotonically as trade costs fall. Its entire market lies in the
home country, so the attractiveness of locating in the foreign country, where
factor prices are lower, increases monotonically as trade costs fall.
Higher elasticity of demand (¾) leads to reduced mark-ups and …ercer
competition in the market for …nal products, and increases the tendency for
an M -sector …rm to move to country f (and thus shift the U-shaped curve
upward), but does – in the absence of taxes – not a¤ect the sustainability of
the supplier sector. We return to the latter point below. In contrast, higher
demand elasticity regarding intermediates, ²; has an ambiguous impact on
the S-sector …rms’ propensity to migrate. A higher ² leads to increased com-
petition among upstream …rms. This implies that both market access and
low factor prices become relatively more important. The foreign country pro-
vides an inferior market access since, by assumption, all downstream …rms
are concentrated in the home country. This disadvantage rises with increas-
ing trade costs. However, the foreign country moreover o¤ers cheaper labour.
As a consequence, considerations related to product market access will dom-
inate for high trade costs; meaning that higher demand elasticity discourages
migration of S …rms. For low trade costs factor market considerations will
start to dominate, and higher demand elasticity encourages migration to the
low wage country.
An increased use of intermediates (´) strengthens the agglomeration forces
sustaining the industrial core in country h, shifting the curves down. As for
the expenditure share on manufacturers (°), as long as labour is totally elas-
tic in supply to the manufacturing agglomeration, a change in this parameter
will not a¤ect the sustainability of the agglomeration. Finally, a lower Á, and
thus an enhanced wage gap between the two countries, unambiguously in-
creases the attractiveness of the foreign country, and therefore shifts both
curves up.
Consider now the impact of economic integration on the home country.
Starting at high trade costs the S-sector will never migrate since its entire
market lies in the home country. For M-sector …rms, on the contrary, the
advantage of being the sole locale provider of manufacturing goods in the
foreign is most pronounced for high trade costs. Product market competition
will, thus, for high enough trade costs induce migration of downstream …rms
in country f , unless the linkages to the upstream sector are too strong. This
is illustrated by the right upward sloping part of the U in Figure 1.
As integration proceeds, the agglomeration forces created by the inter-
industry linkages become relatively more dominant, and serving the foreign
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market through exports becomes a more pro…table alternative. The propen-
sity of the downstream sector to move out of the home country accordingly
declines. Finally, as integration deepens, choice of location is primarily deter-
mined by factor market considerations. This implies that both downstream
and upstream …rms are encouraged to deviate from the industrial core in
country h; and move out to the low wage economy f . However, the up-
stream industry is relatively more labour intensive than the downstream
industry, and international wage di¤erences therefore matter more for up-
stream …rms’ choice of location. As a consequence, when we approach free
trade, the propensity of upstream …rms to migrate will ceteris paribus be
relatively greater than that of downstream …rms.3
4 Industrial policy
We now turn to the analysis of optimal industrial policy in the high wage
home country hosting the agglomeration. In the present modelling frame-
work there are two sources of pecuniary externalities in the precence of trade
costs. The …rst is associated with the link between upstream producers and
their customers - downstream …rms. The second with the link between down-
stream producers and consumers. The pecuniary externalities are symptoms
of the market failure created by the interaction of vertical linkages, increas-
ing returns to scale, and imperfect competition (see Norman, 1996). Hence,
policy interventions might be called for.
In particular, we focus on how optimal industrial policy is a¤ected by the
process of international integration. Globalization has two dimensions; it
a¤ects the mobility of …rms and it a¤ects trade costs. In relation to mobility
we treat two extreme cases: one where …rms are immobile - for instance due
to capital controls - and one where …rms can move without cost.
Throughout the analysis we assume that the low-wage foreign country is
passive, and that it does not pursue any industrial policy.
4.1 Internationally immobile …rms
The entire manufacturing sector is assumed agglomerated in country h, while
country f is completely specialized in agriculture.
3This point has also been made by Puga and Venables (1996), although within a dif-
ferent setting.
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We consider a tax system that allows for taxes on labour income, on costs
in the upstream industry, as well as on costs in the downstream industry.
The government’s objective is to maximize agents’ indirect utility function
with respect to tMh and tSh subject to the public budget constraint. The
government’s maximisation problem is therefore given by
max
tMh;tSh
Vh =
°° (1¡ °)(1¡°) Yh(:)
LhPh(:)
; (26)
s:t: whLhth + tMhw
1¡´
h Q
´
Shnh®¾ + tShwha²mh ¸ 0
Examining the solution to the maximization problem, we shall use the
case of a closed economy as benchmark. Thus, for comparison, consider
a closed economy version of the model above, where country h is active
in both agriculture and manufacturing, but where there is no international
trade. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) analyse such a case employing a model with
one perfectly competitive sector and one monopolistically competitive sector.
They show that the interaction between a desirability of variety, increasing
returns and imperfect competition leads to a market outcome that does not
yield the socially optimum number of kinds. With constant elasticity of
demand, the market equilibrium is, in fact, identical to an optimum con-
strained by the lack of lump sum subsidies, but an unconstrained optimum
is characterised by a greater number of …rms of the same size as in market
equilibrium. In the unconstrained optimum the price charged by each …rm
equals marginal costs, and each …rm covers exactly its variable cost, i.e. each
…rm receives a subsidy equal to its …x cost. The subsidy is …nanced by a
lump sum tax on consumer income.
The model employed here di¤ers from that of Dixit and Stiglitz in the
sense that the imperfectly competitive sector is split into a downstream and
an upstream industry. However, it is straightforward to show that the re-
sults are completely analogous: Subsidies are determined by the elasticity
of demand in the respective industry with t¤Mh = ¡1=¾ and t¤Sh = ¡1=². A
subsidy of 1=² to the S sector gives price (pSh) equal to marginal cost, as can
be seen by inserting the subsidy in (8). Moreover, the total subsidy given
to the upstream industry amounts to the sum of …xed costs in the industry,
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TSh =
1
²
wh (a+ bx)mh = amh. Similarly the subsidy of 1=¾ to the down-
stream sector gives price equal to marginal cost, and implies a total subsidy
equal to the …xed cost in the industry.
Next consider the open economy. The government chooses taxes as to
maximize (26), and in line with the result for a closed economy, the optimal
tax in the upstream sector is again4
t¤Sh = ¡1=²: (27)
Economies of scope in the use of intermediates implies that the market out-
come gives to few varieties of intermediates, and government intervention
allows for price equal to marginal cost and a greater number of varieties.
In deriving the optimal tax for the downstream sector we rely on nu-
merical explorations of the model. Figure 2 illustrates the solution to the
government’s maximization problem for given parameter values by plotting
the …rst order conditions. In a closed economy, analogous to the treatment
of the upstream industry, the downstream industry would have been given
a subsidy equal to 1=¾ …nanced by a tax th on labour income according to
(17). However, as can be seen from Figure 2, in an open economy welfare
maximization requires a tax – not a subsidy – on the downstream industry.
Extensive numerical investigation shows that this will always be the case.
What is the intuition behind this discrepancy in results for closed and
open economies? The pecuniary externality present in manufacturing gen-
erates a rent. Because of free entry, this rent will not be mirrored through
…rms’ pro…ts; nor will it impact on factor returns, since due to the assump-
tions of the model, wages are …xed and equalised across sectors. The rents
that are generated by the industrial agglomeration will, thus, be completely
passed on to consumers – domestic and foreign – through prices and number
of varieties. This means that subsidies to downstream …rms imply transfers
abroad, while a tax allows for rents to be shifted back to the domestic con-
sumers. The reasoning here is in line with that of an optimal tari¤ argument,
but the outcome may be regarded as a second best alternative given the lack
of tari¤ as an instrument. A …rst best outcome would have been reached by
correcting for the market failure by using production subsidies in the down-
stream industry as well, while levying a tari¤ on exports to shift rents home.
But in a world characterised by integration and reduction of obstacles to
trade, such a policy mix hardly seems a relevant option.
4Appendix B indicates how the calculations are made.
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Our simulations show that the tax rate t¤Mh is increasing in parameters
that strengthen agglomeration forces and therefore increase agglomeration
rents - i.e. in the elasticity of demand (¾); in the expenditure share on man-
ufacturing (°); and in the strength of vertical linkages (´) - while declining in
elasticity of demand in the upstream industry (²): The higher the elasticity of
demand, the less signi…cant is the market failure, and the smaller the optimal
subsidy that would have been given if a complete range of policy instruments
were available. A higher elasticity therefore diminishes the incentive to pro-
vide a subsidy, while the incentive to use taxes as an instrument to shift
rents back to domestic consumers remains, and becomes more predominant.
The more skewed consumer preferences are in the direction of manufactur-
ing, the more manufacturing goods will be exported, and thus the larger the
rents that are shifted abroad, and which can be shifted back via a tax on
downstream. As for vertical linkages, the stronger the linkages, the larger
the upstream sector, and the more subsidies it receives. The larger, in turn,
are the gains to consumers from the policy interventions in the upstream
sector, and the larger are the rents which the national government would like
to extract back from foreign consumers. The same type of argument applies
when investigating the impact of demand elasticity in upstream on the tax
on downstream. A lower ² implies greater subsidies to upstream, and more
to be shifted back to the home country.
Our simulations also show that the income from taxing the downstream
industry will always exceed the expenses related to subsidising the upstream
activity, leading to a net subsidy to consumer (labour) income in the home
country. Hereby, the inhabitants in country h are ensured a relatively greater
share of the rents created by the industrial agglomeration.
4.2 Internationally mobile …rms
Let us now proceed to a situation where internalization has led to …rms being
mobile without any costs related to migration. The mobility across borders
a¤ects the maximization problem faced by the government in country h, since
taxes a¤ect …rms’ incentives to migrate to the foreign market. Di¤erentiation
of (24) and (25) yields by inspection
@x¤Mf
@tMh
> 0;
@x¤Mf
@tSh
< 0;
@x¤Sf
@tSh
> 0;
@x¤Sf
@tMh
= 0: (28)
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It comes as no surprise that a tax on either sector encourages …rms to move
to the foreign country. But why does a tax on downstream …rms have zero
impact on upstream …rms, and a tax on upstream …rms discourage down-
stream deviants? Since the market for intermediates is entirely concentrated
in country h, a tax (tMh) on downstream will only a¤ect the propensity for
upstream …rms to deviate, if the tax has an impact on wages. As long as
wages are constant and independent of tax regimes and tax rates, the sustain-
ability condition for upstream …rms is una¤ected by a tax on downstream.
However, tax on upstream a¤ects downstream …rms through two channels:
First, the price for the intermediate composit goes up, as the price of each
variety increases at the same time as number of upstream …rms decreases.
Second, the market for …nal goods expands, since a tax on upstream pro-
duction is met by a subsidy to domestic consumer income. While the former
e¤ect applies equally to downstream …rms in h and f , the latter e¤ect en-
tails relatively improved market access for downstream …rms in country h.
In terms of impact on sustainability, only the latter e¤ect plays a role, and
explains why a tax on upstream actually encourages downstream …rms to
stay in the industrial core in h.
A welfare maximising government has to take into account the impact of
internationalization when deciding on industrial policy. Firms being mobile
means that the policy mix that appeared optimal in a situation with immobile
…rms may not be optimal if it leads to …rms moving out. We compare two
main policy options - to intervene and not to intervene. The …rst policy
implies that the government maximizes welfare subject to the constraint
that the agglomeration is sustained. The second is not to intervene: decisive
for its choice will be which alternative that gives the highest welfare. As we
shall see, there is, however, not necessarily a unique answer to this. Which
alternative that allows the government to attain a maximum level of welfare
will rather depend on the level economic integration: To compare the options
facing the government we shall again rely on numerical simulations. We
report the outcomes for a given set of parameter values, but the results hold
in a qualitative sense for a broad range of parameter values.
We …rst consider the case where the government chooses to intervene and
maximize welfare as per (26) subject to the additional constraints that the
agglomeration should be maintained, i.e. subject to (24) and (25). The
slightly bell-shaped curve in Figure 3 illustrates the solution to this maxi-
mization problem, where welfare is drawn as a function of trade costs. Figure
4 shows the corresponding tax rates on upstream and downstream. We see
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that both welfare and taxes are a¤ected by the level of economic integration.
Welfare peaks at intermediate trade costs, when the agglomeration forces are
strongest, and the scope for domestically extraction of the rents created in
the industrial agglomeration is greatest.
In a situation with immobile …rms, a welfare maximizing government
would subsidize the upstream industry and tax the downstream industry.
However, with internationally mobile …rms, the sustainability condition for
the downstream sector binds for the whole range of trade costs, and impedes
a tax rate as high as what would have been optimal if …rms were immobile
(cf. Figures 2, 3 and 4). As we approach zero trade cost, sustainability
may indeed require a subsidy and not a tax on downstream activity. For
most trade costs the sustainability constraint related to the upstream sector
does not bind, but because of the sectoral cross-e¤ect that a subsidy to this
sector has on downstream, there is a limit to the subsidy that can be given.
The subsidy here will thus always be lower than the one used in the case
with immobile …rms. The kink in the ts in Figure 4 marks the level of trade
costs at which the sustainability condition for the upstream sector becomes
binding.
Worth noting, though, is that the gains from the intervention line reach
their maximum at intermediate costs, at which the tax on downstream and
subsidy to upstream get as close as ever to what would have been optimal
levels in a situation without international mobility. What characterises this
situation is both relatively high subsidies and high taxes. This re‡ects the
fact that strong aglomeration forces both allow for intervention correcting for
the market failure as well as for the local extraction of the rents generated
in the agglomeration.
But the government may also choose not to intervene. From the discussion
of sustainability in section 3 we know that both the S and M industry will
migrate when trade costs become low enough.5 Figure 3 shows welfare when
the government is passive. The agglomeration stays in the home country for
a large range of trade costs, because …rms are tied down by agglomeration
rents. At point A the agglomeration is no longer sustained. When the dust
has settled and the entire agglomeration is located in the foreign country,
welfare has increased to B.6 Further integration from this point leads to a
5Actually, the downstream industry will also migrate for very high trade costs - ¿ close
to 200 percent for our parametrisation. This level of ¿ ; however, is outside our range of
interest.
6From section 3 it is clear that one of the sectors will be the …rst to move. However,
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steep increase in welfare.
Comparing the welfare attained with and without intervention, we see
that whether or not the goverment will wish to conduct an active industrial
policy depends on the level of integration. For high trade costs, the gains from
having the agglomeration exceed the costs. Below A a passive government
would be preferred. Essentially - given the underlying assumptions of the
model - home has a comparative disadvantage in the agglomerated industy.
For low enough trade cost, the gains from production taking place where
factor prices are lowest outweigh the agglomeration bene…ts for the home
country. This means that as trade costs approach zero, reversed patterns of
specialisation and thus relocation of the agglomoration, provide for a welfare
beyond that achieved in the case of immobile …rms.
4.3 Discussion
We have so far assumed that the government follows an optimal policy that
allows for the country’s inhabitants’ welfare to be maximized. If we assume
that we are at a stage where globalization has not yet had an impact on
…rms’ mobility, it follows clearly from the analysis in section 4.1 and Figure
3 that policy intervention will be superior to a laisse-faire line. Pecuniary
externalities symptomizing a market failure will always make us want to
subsidize the agglomeration, while the fact that some of the rents from the
agglomeration are attained by foreigners encourages a simultaneous taxation
of the industry.
Still, political realities may prevent the government from following an
optimal policy. In particular, a policy that allows for the agglomeration to
move out to the low wage country may indeed not be feasible.
Consider the situation for the home country during a process of economic
integration. Once we have reached point A in Figure 4 it would be optimal
to stop interventions and let go of the agglomeration. However, this may not
be politically feasible. A perhaps more politically acceptable policy would
be to let the labour intensive upstream industry (industries) move, while
intervening in order to keep the downstream industry. But this is not an
attractive option at A, since it entails a downward shift in welfare to C.
this type of model does not display any stable equilibria with the two sectors located in
di¤erent countries. The end result must therefore be that the entire agglomeration has
moved to the foreign country.
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Indeed our, simulations show that this alternative will always be inferior to
letting the entire agglomeration move.
However, once the point D is reached, the situation for the home country
is di¤erent. The option of letting the S-sector leave while introducing inter-
ventions allowing for M to stay, becomes attractive. If this policy is followed,
further liberalisation leads to strong welfare gains.
The analysis may have practical relevance. The movement of supplier
…rms to low wage countries is often viewed as a threat in high wage indus-
trial countries. Our analysis indicates that this need not be the case. Once
integration has proceeded far enough, the outmigration of supplier …rms may
instead be a factor that helps high wage countries keep part of an industrial
cluster at a relatively lower cost.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the design of industrial policy in a high wage economy
hosting an industrial cluster of vertically linked industries. Policy analysis
is undertaken within a non-strategic setting, and it is assumed that the gov-
erment’s objective is to maximize national welfare. We show that while in
a closed economy optimal industrial policy would imply the subsidizing of
both downstream and upstream industries, this is no longer optimal in an
open economy setting. Disregarding issues related to internationally mobile
…rms and sustainability, optimal policy mix would in the latter case be to
subsidise the upstream sector to correct for the pecuniary externality, but to
levy a tax on the downstream sector as a means to rent-shifting from foreign
consumers.
The sustainability of the industrial cluster does, however, put restrictions
on the government’s welfare maximization problem. In particular the pos-
sibility to tax the downstream sector is only present to a limited extent.
Neverthelss, during early stages of economic integration, government inter-
vention leads to higher national welfare than what would have been the case
without intervention. As integration proceeds far enough, this is no longer
true. Due to relatively lower factor prices in the foreign country, home utility
would actually increase if the government let the agglomeration move out to
the low wage foreign country.
A policy that involves maintaining the agglomeration in the high wage
country may thus prove very costly as integration deepens. However, geo-
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graphical fragmentation of production, in the sense of letting supplier …rms
move to the low wage countries makes it possible to maintain the downstream
part of the industry in the high wage country at a relatively lower cost. Al-
though this last alternative entails a welfare that is lower than what would
have been achieved if the whole agglomeration had moved to the low wage
country, it is still higher than the one achieved if one seeks to sustain the
whole cluster – and under certain political circumstances it may indeed be
more acceptable.
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A Appendix: Optimal taxes in a core-periphery
case
In accordance with the priorly made assumptions, countries are assumed to
have the same market size, so that income is given by
Yf = 1; Yh = (1¡ th): (29)
Free entry, zero pro…ts, and product market clearing in the upstream sector
(S) implies that ´°(Yh+Yf )
(1+tMh)
= pShxShmh; which together with (29) and (8)
gives number of upstream varieties:
mh =
´°(2¡ th)
a"(1 + tSh)(1 + tMh)
: (30)
Number of downstream varieties is determined by zero pro…ts and product
market clearing in the market for M goods °(Yh + Yf ) = pMhxMhnh, which
together with (29) and (4) gives number of downstream varieties:
nh =
°(2¡ th)
®¾m
´
1¡" (1 + tSh)´(1 + tMh)
(31)
Using, (30),(31) and (17) yields th , tax on labour income, as a function of
tSh and tMh :
th =
¡2°(tMh(1 + tSh) + ´tSh)
1 + (1¡ ´°)tSh + tMh ((1¡ °) (tSh + 1)) : (32)
(32) allows us to elliminate th in (26), which can then be solved for optimal
tSh; whereas optimal tMh is found by numerical simulation.
Parameter values used
Parameters for Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4:
g = 0:45; k = gg(1 ¡ g)(1¡g); a = 0:1; ® = 0:1; " = 2:5; ¾ = 2:5; ´ =
0:4; Á = 0:9
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Figure 1: Sustainability of the agglomeration in the home country
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Figure 2: Welfare maximization with immobile …rms
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Figure 3: Welfare maximization with immobile …rms
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